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Abstract
In this paper I consider how the construction of migration as a problem poses both
ethical and epistemological challenges to migration scholars and how this is related
to political and methodological nationalism. I briefly outline two paradigm shifts that
have been highly generative in our field and beyond – methodological
transnationalism and the mobilities turn, both of which have as their starting point a
critique of the nation state as a container of social processes. Building on these
critiques and alternatives to methodological nationalism I go on to propose an
approach I’m calling ‘methodological denationalism’ which takes as its starting point
the migrant/citizen distinction. Key to this approach is to ‘migrantize’ the citizen, and
I go on to give some examples of how this is done, not only to citizens of colour,
but also to those who support non-citizens or who are the partners of non-citizens.
Finally, I suggest that migrantizing the citizen enables us not only to look at the
ways in which immigration controls affect citizens, but also how we might begin to
make connections between the formal exclusions of noncitizenship and the multiple,
and sometimes informal exclusions within citizenship.
Keywords: Citizenship, Methodological nationalism, Methodological
transnationalism, Migration, Migration studies, Mobilities, Race and racialisation
Social scientists working on racism, class and global inequality are generally keen to
engage with the public about their field of expertise. These issues do not air as often as
they should, but there is one exception: when they are framed in terms of migration.
Indeed, scholars of citizenship and migration in Europe to are more likely to feel –
why does the public insist on talking about ‘migration’? After all, the history of the
world is unavoidably a history of mobility. Beginning with the movement of early
humans from Africa the movement of people has shaped, reinforced and undermined
social relations and institutions for thousands of years. As Glick Schiller and Salazar
(2013) have observed, ‘If we think historically about the human condition it might
seem that we should really have a stasis studies rather than a migration or mobilities
studies’ (p. 185). The story we are told about migration today is a tale of unparalleled
movement and huge demographic change that presents a direct threat to sovereignty,
security and national identity. In Europe migration is seen to pose a ‘tragedy of com-
mons’ to welfare states and a threat to national culture. Scholarship has often sought
to rebut or at least interrogate political claims that migration is of its nature a negative
process and to nuance policy makers’ and the general public’s understandings of mi-
gration. Nevertheless, hostility to migrants seems to have increased despite our best
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efforts, and the significant growth in migration research, research centres, journals, net-
works and post graduate courses. Indeed, perhaps we are experiencing not an ‘age of
migration’ but an age of migration research.
Migration scholars often put a lot of effort into relating with integrity to the many
different political actors and stakeholders who are active in relation to migration and
asylum. In this paper I want to invite reflection about why migration research matters
and how we can study human mobility without turning it into a problem. I’m going to
begin by outlining the ethical and epistemological challenge posed by methodological
nationalism, and briefly some of the highly generative developments in the last two de-
cades. Taking this as my starting point I go on to propose an approach I’m calling
‘methodological denationalism’. Key to this is to ‘migrantize’ the citizen, and I go on to
give some examples of how this is already being experienced by citizens of colour, by
those who support non-citizens and by the partners of non-citizens. Finally, I suggest
that purposefully migrantizing the citizen can help us make connections between the
formal exclusions of non-citizenship and the multiple, and sometimes informal exclu-
sions within citizenship.
The challenge
If everybody moves, when does movement become migration, whose movement counts
as migration and why? Crudely we can distinguish between the ‘migrant’ in law and
policy, the ‘migrant’ in data, and the ‘migrant’ in public debate. These three types of mi-
grants do not easily map on to one another. For example, while the migrant in data is
typically defined as foreign born, many of those ‘migrants’ may be citizens in law,
through naturalisation for example, or deriving citizenship from a parent despite being
born abroad. On the other hand, a person might be foreign born, and a non-citizen in
law, but still not imagined as a ‘migrant’ in public debate. British people living abroad
rarely think of themselves as ‘migrants’ and certainly not ‘illegal immigrants’ whatever
their status in practice. They are expats. The middle class, wealthy and white may ex-
perience immigration controls as collateral damage, but they do not imagine themselves
as the primary target of controls, and very often they are right. Putting it crudely, in
political debate, a ‘migrant’ is a person whose movement, or whose presence, is consid-
ered a problem. In academic research different disciplines tend to select different defi-
nitions: demographers and economists tend to prefer the definition ‘foreign born’
because it does not change; lawyers, ‘foreign national’; while sociologists and anthropol-
ogists are often more concerned with the migrant as someone who is perceived/per-
ceives themselves as out of place or racially othered. This is part of the richness of our
field, the reason we can learn so much from one another, and why an interdisciplinary
or multi-disciplinary approach is so important.
There have been real efforts to broaden the scope of migration studies to include the
full range of mobile non-citizens. Ground-breaking work on ‘lifestyle migration’, return
migration, highly skilled migrants, children and young people, and retirement has ex-
amined the mobilities and identity making including of often relatively privileged and
affluent groups (see for example, Benson & O’Reilly, 2016, 2009; King, 2002; Kofman,
2012; Sigona & Hughes, 2010; Tryandafyllidou & Isaakyan, 2016). However, migration
studies in general continues to focus on the mobility of the poor and the subordinated.
Again, we should note that this is not unique to our field. The social sciences have always
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been particularly interested in the marginalised and the disadvantaged. Five decades ago
Laura Nader asked with reference to her own discipline of anthropology ‘whether the
entirety of fieldwork does not depend upon a certain power relationship in favour of the
anthropologist, and whether indeed such dominant-subordinate relationships may not be
affecting the kinds of theories we are weaving’ (Nader, 1969, p. 289).
For academic research the ‘ideologically charged’ migration lexicon is not only a ter-
minological and epistemological challenge, but a conceptual, ethical and theoretical
one, as it assumes a tension between embedded ‘natives’ and out of place ‘aliens’ and
this tension lies at the heart of contemporary concerns about human mobility. Cross-
border mobility is not the natural marker of difference that is often imagined, any more
than nation state borders themselves are natural, and human movement is only contin-
gently constituted as a problem for ‘migration’ policy and as an object of investigation.
The study of migration has tended to reinforce the strongly imagined norm of national
and stable communities disrupted by migrants – even as it has endeavoured to show
for example how those migrants have enriched those communities economically and
culturally. The identification of a population and its associated problems draws even
those researchers who strive for analytical objectivity into participation in politics and
governance (Bacchi, 2012). Indeed, the making of the difference between ‘migrant’ and
‘citizen’ is key to the creation and governing of nation states and their territorial bor-
ders, and attending to the (colonial) histories of borders reveals their generative rather
than purely regulatory nature (Malkki, 1995; Mongia, 1999; Ngai, 2004; Papadopoulos,
Stephenson, & Tsianos, 2008; Torpey, 2000; Van Walsum, 2008). This state governed
differentiation attempts to fix mobilities’ role in social relations in very particular ways
which depend on history and context, but the critical point is that ‘migrants’ are subor-
dinate to ‘citizens’. This subordination can be very direct such as when migrant workers
are dependent on employers for their visas, but it also suffuses the contemporary polit-
ics of immigration: immigration controls must be for the security and benefit of the
citizenry, and they mark states’ claims to prioritise their citizens’ needs over those of
foreign residents.
Shifting paradigms and new approaches
As is evident from the work cited above, those of us studying immigration have not
been unaware of this problem, often acknowledging that difference is not only made by
law, policy and politics, but also by research. Rooted in ‘migration studies’ and building
on the work of Beck, but also of mobilities scholars, Wimmer and Glick Schiller made
a substantial contribution to social science in their elaboration of ‘methodological na-
tionalism’, a model that naturalises the nation state as a container of social processes
and thereby pre-determines and defines certain objects of sociological enquiry
(Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). One of their aguments captures a preoccupation
of this paper, that migration studies’ uncritical embracing of the nation/state/society as a
natural social and political form, implicated scholars in nation state building processes.
The problem of methodological nationalism is particularly acute in migration studies but
it runs across the social sciences. It is compounded by the nature of academic funding re-
gimes, both national and philanthropic, which have fuelled the understanding of certain
kinds of human movement as a ‘problem’ to be solved.
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Emerging from Wimmer and Glick Schiller’s critique for example was the re-
search paradigm of transnationalism that recognised human communities and
communications as not restricted to a single nation state and ‘migrants’ as build-
ing social fields that connect across borders (Glick Schiller, 1999; Vertovec,
2007). ‘Transnational studies’ sought to de-centre the nation state and look across
spaces and scales, enabling us to see how the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ change when
we ‘don’t assume they are automatically linked to particular types of territory or
space’ (Levitt & Khagram, 2007). Faist for example proposes a methodological
toolbox for the effective study of transnational phenomena including specificity in
unit of analysis and the usefulness of the concept of transnational spaces which
can ‘provide alternative definitions of units of analysis that are general enough to
think of social entities as de-territorialized and territorialized at the same time’
(Faist, 2012, p. 57).
Famously the work of John Urry (2000) sought to challenge the position of national
society as sociology’s ‘central concept’, arguing that its centrality deprived sociology of
the tools to understand globalisation. Urry was a prominent voice in what became de-
scribed as the ‘mobilities turn’. This aimed ‘to develop through appropriate metaphors
a sociology which focuses upon movement, mobility and contingent ordering, rather
than upon stasis, structure and social order’ (Urry, 2007, p. 18). It linked different scales
and forms of movement and promoted methodological moves away from boundedness
and the sedentary, and highlighted the importance to the global economy of the inter-
section of everyday lives with mobility systems. Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) wel-
comed the normalizing of mobility but argued that it does not pay enough attention to
different barriers to movement, proposing ‘regimes of mobility’ to explore the relation-
ship between privileged and stigmatised im/mobility, and defining movement within so-
cial and economic relationships rather than simply across borders.
These kinds of efforts to escape methodological nationalism have gone signifi-
cantly beyond critique to offer alternative frameworks for understanding and ana-
lysis. However, while social science have gone some way to recognising the
distorting effects of methodological nationalism, political theory has tended to be
rather disengaged from these debates (Sager, 2016). There have, to be sure, been in-
credibly productive debates about post-national, de-national and transnational citizenship,
including explorations of the many varieties of citizenship that encompass how contem-
porary states have accommodated human mobility such as dual citizenship, long term
residence, European citizenship, and turning a blind eye (Bauböck, 2017; Sassen, 2002;
Soysal, 1994, 2011). These and other scholars are concerned with varieties of political
community and how the nation state can be expanded or recognised as only one of mul-
tiple layers of political membership, though notably this membership can continue to have
primacy even in the ‘postnational’: ‘rights and membership of individuals remain orga-
nized within nation-states. The nation-state continues to be the repository of cultures of
nationhood and institutions through which rights and membership policies are imple-
mented’ (Soysal, 2011).
Engin Isin and Greg Nielson (2008) pioneered a conceptualisation of ‘acts of citizen-
ship’, arguing that events performed by ‘migrants’ themselves can constitute citizenship,
asking what makes the citizen, (rights claims) rather than who is the citizen. But why
does politics have to be constituted within citizenship? As Bhambra remarks:
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This assumes that people outside of citizenship are not political and that being
outside of citizenship is not itself politically constituted in terms of stabilising
particular relations of domination. Further, there is no recognition within the
analysis as posed that the very idea of citizenship being mobilized is itself
constitutive of the division that is then to be overcome through struggles for
citizenship.
Bhambra, 2015.
The study of migration has increasingly engaged with the study of borders and
bordering, demonstrating, as Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy argue (2019), the
entanglement of the projects of governance and belonging that lie, not at the mar-
gins, but at the centre of political life. This connects migration with the politics of
race, class and ‘indigeneity’ (with its very different implications in Europe and in
settler colonies) (Back, Sinha, & Bryan, 2012; De Genova, 2018; Goldberg, 2006;
Lentin, 2014; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). People have started to bring the work of
post-colonial scholars into conversation with migration literature, and explore the
relationship between colonialism, citizenship and mobility controls and the ways in
which the coloniality of power saturates contemporary immigration policy and
practice (Carver, 2019; De Sousa Santos, 2007; El-Enany, in press; Sharma, in press;
Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2018; Mamdani, 2018; Mayblin, 2017; Mongia, 2018). These
efforts challenge the assumed distinction between ‘migrant’ and ‘citizen’ that under-
girds some of the toxic politics in many European countries and beyond. However,
as Nandita Sharma, among others, has pointed out, decolonialism can seem com-
patible with certain kinds of nationalism, territorialism and sovereignty, that is, it
does not necessarily mean denationalism (Sharma, in press). Yet it is a crucial
starting point to answer my original question: how do we research migration with-
out reinforcing the migrant as a problematic subject? How do we recognise the
key role of the nation state without falling prey to methodological nationalism?
How to move outside the mutual reinforcing circle of migration – critical migra-
tion studies towards methodological de-nationalism?
Methodological de-nationalism
By methodological de-nationalism I mean an approach that builds on the in-
sights of transnational studies, mobilities’ paradigms, and bordering and decolo-
nial approaches, that is, that recognises that borders and citizenship are
politically constituted and historically and economically embedded. However,
while sympathetic to Levitt and Khagam’s proposal to adopt a gaze that ‘begins
without borders’, such gazes have their own ontologies (Marston, Jones, &
Woodward, 2005) and their own normative and historically embedded assump-
tions. Even in a ‘borderless world of networks’ we cannot ‘objectively’ simply
trace actually existing networks.
In the case of migration studies, recognising the constructed nature of the categories
of migrant and citizen does not mean that we therefore simply shed them. Whether
one is a ‘migrant’ or a ‘citizen’ matters both normatively and empirically. It matters in
at least three ways. Firstly, immigration status matters, being subject to immigration
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control and/or being ultimately deportable has all kinds of impacts on a person’s life. It
impacts on a range of rights, and it impacts on life plans, on how and indeed whether
one can imagine a future. It impacts too on social relations. In systems where citizens
can sponsor migrants as employees and partners for example, it makes for more com-
pliant workers and spouses. Conversely, being a citizen gives access to a range of rights
depending on the state of citizenship, − and it also usually means that a person can be
deported to their state of citizenship.
Secondly, nationalised subjectivities matter to how we imagine ourselves and who be-
longs. Ideas about our place in the ‘national order of things’ give rise to many different
forms of socialities and politics, but they are constructed in an everyday way (Billig, 1995;
Dzenovska, 2013; Malkki, 1995). Nationalised subjectivities are not confined to citizens.
Those legally classified and/or socially imagined as ‘migrants’ may also feel the importance
of language and habits more strongly than they do when they are living ‘at home’ and
much migrant organising for instance, is around country of origin. That is, for the people
we engage with, migration and citizenship matters both normatively and empirically,
practices of mobility are shaped by the material reality of the national order of things
and that the national order of things also lends meaning to mobility in collective and
individual narratives. At the same time, the experiences of mobility* and the
associated emplacement and displacement*exceed their co-optation by national(ist)
common sense
Dzenovska, p. 205.
Thirdly, the state, while contingent and multi-faceted, constructs economic and social
relations. It creates law and policy and encourages behaviour and relations that shape
social and political lives and experiences in very material ways including but not re-
stricted to the institution and relations of citizenship. Law and policy do not only shape
relations of political representation and participation but also the national landscapes
of labour market, welfare state, housing, education, cultural practices and so on. For ex-
ample, national labour markets are created in large part by the national institutions,
laws and policies of states. It is not only who is allowed to work, but under what condi-
tions, with what rights and protections, for what wages. These are set by states and dif-
fer between them. This is in a context where, for all the academic critique of the
traditional conceptual tools of liberal politics and sociology like ‘the state’ and ‘the na-
tion’, and despite significant changes to ways of thinking about power, nevertheless the
state/government continues to be the frame through which public discourse under-
stands the distribution and accountability of political power (Rose, 1999).
By methodological de-nationalism I mean an approach that does not assume differ-
ence between state differentiated categories and seeks to investigate what this does for
theory, politics and practice. It makes visible and investigates the workings of state-
imposed categories of migrant and citizen in all their differentiations, their impacts on
the experiences of individuals and groups, and the management, governance and ac-
countability of national(ised) territories and international/global relations more gener-
ally. It recognises the continuing power of the state and the national order of things,
how they work together to inform our understandings of ‘society’, political power and
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accountability, and also can order engagement with politics, with communities, and
with the histories and cultures that we claim. Yet also that ‘local understandings of em-
placement’ may be enfolded in Dzenovska’s ‘national(ist) common sense, and are by no
means necessarily reducible to it (Dzenovska, 2013, p. 205). While acknowledging the
consequences of sovereignty and constituted national institutions, including na-
tional welfare states, methodological de-nationalism must be attentive to the im-
pact on the migrant/citizen of the interaction of global, regional and local
institutions and processes. Finally, like transnational studies it is informed by a
sensibility that historicises the theories, concepts and practices of the field (in
this case, migration) to better understand contingency, assumptions, and possibil-
ities that inform research and practice. In this way it has the potential to recover
relationalities and interdependence to shed light on the impacts of methodo-
logical nationalism beyond the academy and into politics.
Migrantizing the citizen
What then are migration scholars and activists to do with the category of ‘migrant’?
Firstly, we must be attentive to the distinction between social, legal and data under-
standings of who counts as a ‘migrant’ and a ‘citizen’, how these interact, contradict
and reinforce one another. I am here going to focus on the ‘social’ use of the term,
which is also quite pervasive in migration research, and here one can turn to critical
race theory to look at ways of responding to the epistemological, ethical and conceptual
challenge of managing and developing an ‘inherited’ concept. Mills (2017) helpfully
compares ‘race’ to ‘phlogiston’ and ‘witch’. ‘Phlogiston’ was a gas that was believed to
be omitted by materials on combustion, but when phlogiston was proven not to exist it
was dropped as a scientific construct. Conversely, witches in the sense of evil women
with magical powers do not exist either, but the witch is still used in stories and as a
term describing believers in Wiccan religion.
…‘race’ is arguably more like ‘witch’ than ‘phlogiston’ in that many social and
political theorists have contended it can still do useful work for us… Instead of
seeing race… as part of a natural hierarchy, one reconceptualizes it so it refers to
one’s structural location in a racialised social system, thereby generating a successor
concept. People are ‘raced’ according to particular rules – we shift from a noun to a
verb, from a pre-existing ‘natural’ state to an active social process.
Mills, 2017, p. 5
Migration studies has got half-way to a successor concept in the debates about the
terminology of illegality/undocumented/unauthorised/clandestine etc. No one is illegal,
any more than they are witches, but they are ‘illegalised’ through an active social – and
state endorsed – process. Perhaps then we can think of ‘migrantized people’ – though I
would be grateful if someone could think of a less ugly word. In this spirit there have
been calls to ‘demigrantize’ migration studies, that is to ‘move away from treating the
migrant population as the unit of analysis and investigation and instead direct the focus
on parts of the whole population, which obviously includes migrants’ (Dahinden, 2016)
in this way de-exceptionalizing migration.
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In tandem with the ‘demigrantizing’ of ‘migrants’ then I suggest that it is helpful to at
the same time ‘migrantize’ the citizen. The instability of the category of ‘migrant’ after
all destabilises the category of ‘citizen’. Migrantizing the citizen is precisely what the
everyday terminology of ‘second generation’ migrant or ‘person of migration heritage’
encourages us to do. Who sheds and who retains their migrancy is often bound up with
nationally specific ways of encoding and remaking of race and it is too easy to dismiss
this as simply because of public ignorance. The development of the modern state
‘depended on the ideological work of manufacturing sameness’ and in differentiating
between, on the one hand subjects/citizens/natives (and their differentially excluded de-
pendents of wives, children, slaves etc), and on the other hand strangers/foreigners/mi-
grants (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Goldberg, 2002). As David Goldberg has so
brilliantly argued, this sameness became bound up with the ideological work of the
construction of race. Importantly, states are not only about statehood, but about na-
tional statehood. It is the national that can be called on to legitimise state practice –
the response to a call to respect the national interest is likely to be very different to the
response to a call to respect state interest. The nationalising logic of sameness derives
on a conceptualization and categorization of ‘race’ within Europe and in Europe’s col-
onies. Scarcely surprising then that racialised differentiations can be highly relevant in
popular identifications of ‘migrant’, overriding legal status or other forms of belonging
(Anderson, 2013). As Lentin puts it:
Managing migration by regulating mobility, policing the border, mandatorily
detaining asylum seekers and deporting those labelled “undocumented” are as much
about the regulation of the spaces within the territorial border as they are an attempt
to draw an ever tighter distinction between inside and outside.
Lentin, 2017
The hostility to migration in many states today cannot be understood independently
of the migrant as a racialised category, but migration scholarship has demonstrated a
certain aversion to discussing ‘race’ and racism, preferring ideas of ethnicity or culture
and, relatedly, integration. But once migration is no longer at the border it becomes
‘race’, and minority ethnic citizens are often already ‘migrantized’ (Erel, Murji, & Naha-
boo, 2016; Jones et al., 2017; Virdee, 2014). Perhaps the paramount example of this in
Europe are Roma people who may be EU citizens, yet nevertheless are often removed/
deported as criminals (France), nomads (Italy), or homeless (UK). In the US work by
the legal scholar Stevens (2011) for example has found that thousands of US citizens
have been (illegally) deported – migrantized in practice. Typically these deported citi-
zens share characteristics with people who are recognised as vulnerable to signing false
confessions: Black, with poor literacy and mental health challenges.
The imbrication of immigration and race is vividly illustrated in the UK where the re-
sponsibility for immigration enforcement has been rolled out to a whole range of differ-
ent non-immigration actors: not only employers but drivers, landlords, registrars,
public service providers, even academic lecturers, are required to check that people are
complying with immigration requirements. These consequences are felt much more
strongly by Black than by white people. This was vividly illustrated in late April 2018
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when the UK was hit by the so-called Windrush Scandal. The lives of large numbers of
Black British residents who had lived legally in the UK since the 1950s had been
destroyed – evicted, denied medical treatment, refused entry to the UK, summarily
sacked, detained – because they were unable to demonstrate their rights of residence
and in some cases their citizenship. Immigration policy is far from being of no import
to citizens. Citizens are affected by immigration law and can find themselves caught up
in the immigration net and this is not confined to the UK.
Citizens are also affected by immigration law as a consequence of the require-
ment to enforce. In many states the criminalisation of citizens via immigration laws
has been increasing. There has been a significant rise in what the Institute of Race
Relations has called, ‘crimes of solidarity’. Across Europe criminal laws designed to
target organised crime and profiteers are applied to fit an anti-refugee agenda
(Institute of Race Relations, 2017). Those who assist people who cross borders are
being accused of smuggling, trafficking, and even being ‘slave-traders’. Sea rescue,
giving lifts to people within as well as across borders, provision of food and water
and medical care, are all becoming offences. These kinds of measures hit citizens
who are engaged in migration politics, but non-activist citizens too can find them-
selves in breach of the law should they employ people who do not have the right
to work for example.
Strong enforcement not only reminds those migrants who are not deported that they
are deportable, it also reminds those citizens who enforce, or who are subject to en-
forcement, that they are not deportable. The effect of this normalisation of immigration
enforcement is to present a fantasy citizenship of full social inclusion even as in prac-
tice citizenship is highly differentiated in terms of diversity of race, gender, sexuality or
disability (e.g. Williams, 1998; Young, 1989). As Cohen puts it: ‘In the final analysis
citizenship does not make a citizenry equal. In fact, it appears to institutionalize both
difference and inequalities, albeit in sometimes unexpected ways’ (Cohen 2009, p. 12).
The current obsession with immigration as a problem turns attention well away
from the gendered, classed and racialized borders within formal citizenship,
depicting all citizens as fully and equally included. Yet immigration enforcement
itself is one of the mechanisms that helps to create differentiated citizenship. It
bears down disproportionately not only on minority ethnic citizens, but also on
those who don’t have money. Consider the now standard requirement across
most EU member states that citizens have minimum earnings before being able
to be joined by third country national partners and by their children. In the UK
nearly two thirds of British women in employment do not earn enough to be
joined by a third country national partner, let alone children. A right to family
life that has been denied low waged or unemployed citizens whatever their ethnic
background.
Migrantizing the citizen excavates the connections between exclusions within citi-
zenship and exclusions from citizenship realising the potential to complicate argu-
ments that set up a homogenised ‘migrant’ in conflict with a homogenised ‘white
working class’ in a ‘natural’ competition for resources and status. Whiteness is not
stable or homogenous and it becomes visible under certain conditions and for cer-
tain groups. In the hierarchy of whiteness Roma, gypsies and EU nationals from
poorer countries are considered ‘white’ yet still may be classed as undesirable
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‘migrants’ and subjected to discriminatory labour conditions and racialized violence.
Methodological de-nationalism demands careful thinking about the relation be-
tween immigration, race, nationality and class, how they reinforce each other and
are contested in the current conjuncture and how, in practice, this complicates the
migrant/citizen binary.
Methodological de-nationalism beyond immigration controls
Methodological de-nationalism does not mean discounting mobility but rather consid-
ering migration as one of the multiple ways in which people’s movement has been
guided and constrained over the centuries. Even before the introduction of welfare
states, in many European states poor relief was limited to parish residents and the poor
were liable to be ‘moved on’ if there was any suggestion that they might become un-
employed, stay long enough to make a claim on the parish, or have a baby that would
be born in the parish and therefore be the parish’s responsibility. And what are immi-
gration controls but attempts to control the mobility of the poor, to tie certain people
to places, albeit allegiance is now owed to nation states rather than lords. Analysing im-
migration controls as part of a gamut of measures that are used to control the mobility
of the poor, whatever their citizenship helps us make connections between immigration
controls and different scales of movement. Thus while a citizen may have a right to be
present on the territory that does not give them the right to be in any public space. Cit-
izens who are homeless or who beg can be prohibited access to certain spaces or
moved on. This is often done at local authority level: in Barcelona for example, begging
by citizens can be prosecuted as obstructing the “peaceful free movement” of citizens.
To allow some citizens their rights of free movement, others are immobilised, fenced in
or fenced out.
One way of connecting the exclusions from formal citizenship with those of ‘differen-
tiated citizenship’ is to make visible the worker citizen. Europe has a long history of at-
tributing a strong moral value to labour from all sides of the political spectrum.
Unemployed formal citizens are often considered not mobile enough. Stuck in housing
estates or rural areas, not prepared to get on their bike they must be prodded off their
sofas and into employment. These prods can be delivered by welfare benefit require-
ments, which demand a person be prepared to travel a certain distance to work, but at
the same time, moving around too much can raise issues when one wants to make a
claim on the state. Indeed, access to the welfare state has replaced the levers of immi-
gration controls as a means of controlling the international mobility of certain EU
citizens. To deter non-earning people who do not have the resources to support them-
selves, complex restrictions on access to certain non-contributory benefits are imposed.
Importantly returning nationals are not exempt from these restrictions – they may be
legal citizens but they are no longer local residents.
Critical to the governing of these restrictions is not only movement but time. Migra-
tion researchers have explored the different ways in which immigration controls shape
migrants’ relation to the labour market, and how temporary visas often push them into
highly precarious work. Yet workers who have not been employed for longer than a
certain period cannot make certain kinds of claims on an employer and qualifying pe-
riods structure the standard employment relationship for migrants and citizens alike
(Grabham, 2016). Despite their apparently marginal status, qualifying periods are a key
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part of the legal apparatus enabling and encouraging ‘the structural expansion of con-
tingent employment’ (Peck & Theodore, 2012, p. 742). Qualifying periods and temporal
controls also feature strongly in welfare state regimes. Foregrounding time as a bound-
ary around access to rights (Cohen, 2018) rather than citizenship per se has the poten-
tial to recalibrate assumptions about the relation between the citizen and the migrant,
and the functioning of immigration controls and welfare benefits. Perhaps we can think
of migrants as at the sharpest end of the temporal restrictions that surround access to
many rights for citizens as well as foreigners.
Indeed, if ideas of race and ethnicity speak to the inclusions and exclusions of nation
and histories, attention to time and temporality speak to ways of connecting migrants
and citizens through state governance. States govern through time and the intense
focus on migration as movement across international borders has tended to mean that
until recently the ways in which states exercise control over temporalities has been
overlooked. Many political theorists are agreed that migrants accrue rights over time,
and that deportation becomes more egregious as one develops connections (Carens,
2013). The ways that states exercise control over time is intrinsic to immigration con-
trols and to the moving of the border inside of territory. States impose temporal limita-
tions on residence through time limited visas, intervening in migratory processes and
life stages to cut them into temporal chunks and migrants typically have to reside
legally in a state for a set number of years before they can claim certain rights. Bureau-
cracies may also subject applicants (for asylum, visa renewal, citizenship) to long
periods of uncertainty and suspense. Without a time frame or anticipated future to
work towards, people can struggle to cope and find it difficult to make progress or
invest in themselves.
While there is a developing literature on time and immigration detention and rights
to settlement and citizenship, it is not only the lives of the mobile that are temporally
governed, but also the lives of citizens, and citizens too are experiencing temporal
shifts. The idea of an overly powerful present and prolonged youth for people with un-
certain futures has been noted by Jeffrey (2010) who has written powerfully about
‘timepass’ in India describing the increasing numbers of people subject to chronic wait-
ing where promised access to social goods, economic resources, settling in some way, is
always coming soon but never quite there. Even in the rich world, as jobs are more
precarious, homes more expensive, pensions more fragile, the sense of permanent tem-
porariness and unsettlement is more pervasive.
Conclusion
The study of mobilities, and human mobilities draws attention to the problem of meth-
odological nationalism and migration is a field which demands new approaches. In Eur-
ope today the challenge is to draw out the connections between the crises of increasing
European poverty and associated popular anger and resentment on the one hand, and
immigration controls on the other. Fantasy citizenship benefits from the affective pull
of the nation, from which the state derives legitimacy. In an age of precarity it seems
that the nation has an even stronger affective pull, and worker solidarities can be diffi-
cult to generate in a gig economy and accelerating inequalities at all scales. The coup-
ling of economic squeeze and immigration is always in danger of being reduced to a
simple message: ‘We must look after our own first. We must first attend to the housing,
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benefit and health needs of our population. Sorry, but there is just not enough to go
around’. The ‘we’ here is the citizen talking across the border, but in addresses within
the border, the ‘we’ may be the taxpayer, or residents in a municipality, or homeowners.
Methodological de-nationalism seeks to excavate the connections in exclusionary
logics.
Promises of strong control over immigration appeal to the hope of a national labour
market and economy, a stable cohesive national society and representative democratic
politics. These hopes are eminently understandable, but they will not be attained by
exerting ever tighter control over immigration. Indeed, the risk is that the obsession en-
gendered by immigration only increases exploitation in labour markets, destabilises
neighbourly relations and caricatures democratic politics. Mobility and international
migration are indications of our interdependence, the challenge is how to make these
interdependencies visible. Perhaps we can start from the insight that what is bad for
migrants is not good for citizens, indeed, it is often bad for citizens as well.
Acknowledgments
The intellectual generosity of Professor Engin Isin and Dr. Nandita Sharma is gratefully acknowledged.
Declarations
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
Author’s contributions
The author read and approved the final manuscript.
Funding
No external funding was required for this paper.
Competing interests
The author declares that she has no competing interests.
Received: 30 March 2019 Accepted: 10 July 2019
References
Anderson, B. (2013). Us and them? The dangerous politics of immigration control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bacchi, C. (2012). Why study problematizations? Making politics visible. Open Journal of Political Science, 2(01), 1–8.
Back, L., Sinha, S., & Bryan, C. (2012). New hierarchies of belonging. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 15(2), 139–154.
Bauböck, R. (Ed.). (2017). Transnational citizenship and migration. Abingdon: Routledge.
Benson, M., & O’Reilly, K. (2016). From lifestyle migration to lifestyle in migration: Categories, concepts and ways of thinking.
Migration Studies, 4(1), 20–37.
Benson, M., & O'Reilly, K. (2009). Migration and the search for a better way of life: A critical exploration of lifestyle migration.
The Sociological Review, 57(4), 608–625.
Bhambra, G. (2015). Citizens and others: The constitution of citizenship through exclusion. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,
40(2), 102–114.
Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage.
Carens, J. (2013). The ethics of immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carver, N. (2019). The silent backdrop: Colonial anxiety at the border. Journal of Historical Sociology. https://doi.org/1
0.1111/johs.12238
Cohen, E. F. (2009). Semi-citizenship in democratic politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, E. F. (2018). The political value of time: Citizenship, duration, and democratic justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Comaroff, J. L., & Comaroff, J. (1997). The dialectics of modernity on a south African frontier. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Dahinden, J. (2016). A plea for the ‘de-migranticization’ of research on migration and integration. Ethnic and Racial Studies,
39(13), 2207–2225.
De Genova, N. (2018). The ‘migrant crisis’ as racial crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41(10),
1765–1782.
De Sousa Santos, B. (2007). Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges. Review (Fernand Braudel
Center), 30(1), 45–89.
Dzenovska, D. (2013). The great departure: Rethinking national(ist) common sense. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
39(2), 201–218. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.723254
El-Enany, N. (in press). (B)ordering Britain: law, race and empire. London: Hart.
Erel, U., Murji, K., & Nahaboo, Z. (2016). Understanding the contemporary race-migration nexus. Ethnic and Racial Studies,
39(8), 1339–1360.
Anderson Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:36 Page 12 of 13
Faist, T. (2012). Toward a transnational methodology: Methods to address methodological nationalism, essentialism, and
positionality. Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, 28(1), 51–70.
Glick Schiller, N. (1999). Transmigrants and nation-states: Something old and something new in the US experience immigrant
experience. InC. Hirschmann, J. Dewind, & P. Kasinitz (Eds.), The handbook of international migration: The American
experience, (pp. 94–119). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Glick Schiller, N., & Salazar, N. (2013). Regimes of mobility across the global. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(2), 183–200.
Goldberg, D. T. (2002). The racial state. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Goldberg, D. T. (2006). Racial Europeanization. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(2), 331–364.
Grabham, E. (2016). Time and technique: The legal lives of the 26-week qualifying period. Economy and Society, 45(3–4), 379–406.
Gutiérrez Rodríguez, E. (2018). The coloniality of migration and the ‘refugee crisis’: On the asylum-migration nexus, the
transatlantic white European settler colonialism-migration and racial capitalism. Refuge, 34(1), 16–28.
Institute of Race Relations (2017). Humanitarianism: The unacceptable face of solidarity. London: Institute of Race Relations.
Isin, E. & Neilsen, G. (Eds.). (2008). Acts of Citizenship. London: Zed Books.
Jeffrey, C. (2010). Timepass: Youth, class, and the politics of waiting in India. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Jones, H., Gunaratnam, Y., Bhattacharyya, G., Davies, W., Dhaliwal, J. E., & Saltus, R. (2017). Go home? The politics of immigration
controversies. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
King, R. (2002). Towards a new map of European migration. International Journal of Population Geography, 8(2), 89–106.
Kofman, E. (2012). Gender and skilled migration in Europe. Cuadernos de Relaciones Internacionales, 30(1), 63–89.
Lentin, A. (2014). Post-race, post politics: The paradoxical rise of culture after multiculturalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37(8),
1268–1285.
Lentin, A. (2017, May 11). De-racing the border [Blog post]. Retrieved from http://www.alanalentin.net/2017/05/11/de-racing-the-
border/.
Levitt, P., & Khagram, S. (2007). The transnational studies reader: Intersections and innovations. London: Routledge.
Malkki, L. (1995). Refugees and exile: From ‘refugee studies’ to the national order of things. Annual Review of Anthropology, 24,
495–523.
Mamdani, M. (2018). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Marston, S., Jones, J. P., & Woodward, K. (2005). Human geography without scale. Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers, 30(4), 416–432.
Mayblin, L. (2017). Asylum after empire: Colonial legacies in the politics of asylum seeking. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Mezzadra, S., & Neilson, B. (2013). Border as method, or, multiplication of labor. Durham: Duke University Press.
Mills, C. (2017). Black rights/white wrongs: The critique of racial liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mongia, R. (1999). Race, nationality, mobility: A history of the passport. Public Culture, 11(3), 527–555.
Mongia, R. (2018). Indian migration and empire: A colonial genealogy of the modern state. Durham: Duke University Press.
Nader, L. (1969). Up the anthropologist: Perspectives gained from ‘studying up. In D. Hyms (Ed.), Reinventing anthropology,
(pp. 284–311). New York: Random House.
Ngai, M. (2004). Impossible subjects: Illegal immigrants and the making of modern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Papadopoulos, D., Stephenson, N., & Tsianos, V. (2008). Escape routes: Control and subversion in the 21st century.
London: Pluto Press.
Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2012). Politicizing contingent work: Countering neoliberal labor market regulation... From the bottom
up? South Atlantic Quarterly, 111(4), 741–761.
Rose, N. (1999). Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sager, A. (2016). Methodological nationalism, migration and political theory. Political Studies, 64(1), 42–59.
Sassen, S. (2002). Towards post-national and denationalized citizenship. In E. Isin, & B. Turner (Eds.), Handbook of citizenship
studies. London: Sage.
Sharma, N. (in press). Home Rule: national sovereignty and the separation of natives and migrants. Durham: Duke University Press.
Sigona, N., & Hughes, V. (2010). Being children and undocumented in the UK: A background paper (Working Paper No. 78, pp. 1-
46). COMPAS. Retrieved from http://www.childmigration.net/Sigona_10.
Soysal, Y. (1994). Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Soysal, Y.N. (2011). Postnational citizenship: Rights and obligations of individuality. Heinrich Boll Stiftung Migrationspolitisches Portal.
Retrieved from https://heimatkunde.boell.de/2011/05/18/postnational-citizenship-rights-and-obligations-individuality.
Stevens, J. (2011). U.S. government unlawfully detaining and deporting U.S. citizens as aliens. Virginia Journal of Social Policy &
the Law, 18(3), 606–720.
Torpey, J. (2000). The invention of the passport. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tryandafyllidou, A., & Isaakyan, I. (Eds.). (2016). High skill migration and recession: Gendered perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Urry, J. (2000). Mobile sociology. The British Journal of Sociology, 51(1), 185–203.
Urry, J. (2007). Mobilities. London: Polity Press.
Van Walsum, S. (2008). The family and the nation: Dutch family migration policies in the context of changing family norms.
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054.
Virdee, S. (2014). Racism, class and the racialized outsider. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Williams, M. S. (1998). Voice, trust, and memory: Marginalized groups and the failings of liberal representation. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: Nation–state building, migration and the
social sciences. Global Networks, 2(4), 301–334.
Young, I. (1989). Polity and group difference: A critique of the ideal of universal citizenship. Ethics, 99(2), 250–274.
Yuval-Davis, N., Wemyss, G., & Cassidy, K. (2019). Bordering. London: Wiley.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Anderson Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:36 Page 13 of 13
